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ABSTRACT. We develop a behavioral commodity market model with consumers,
producers and heterogeneous speculators to characterize the nature of commodity
price ﬂuctuations and to explore the effectiveness of price stabilization schemes.
Within our model, nonlinear interactions between market participants can create ei-
therbullorbearmarkets, orirregularpriceﬂuctuationsbetweenbullandbearmarkets.
Both the imposition of a bottoming price level (to support producers) or a topping
price level (to protect consumers) can reduce market price volatility. However, simple
policy rules, such as price limiters, may have unexpected consequences in a complex
environment: a minimum price level decreases the average price while a maximum
price limit increases the average price. In addition, price limiters inﬂuence the price
dynamics in an intricate way and may cause volatility clustering.
Key words and phrases. Commodity markets, price stabilization, simple limiters, technical and funda-
mental analysis, bifurcation analysis, chaos control.




Commodity prices are, by any standard, extremely volatile. After inspecting thirteen
primary commodities over the period 1900-1987 (deﬂated annual data), Deaton and
Laroque (1992) found price variation coefﬁcients, deﬁned as the standard deviation
over the mean, ranging from 0.17 (bananas) to 0.60 (sugar). In addition, one often
observes dramatic boom and bust episodes. For instance, the decline in prices from
the highest level reached in the period from 1974 to August 1975 was 67 percent for
sugar, 58 percent for sisal, more than 40 percent for cotton and rubber, and more than
25 percent for cocoa and jute (Newbery and Stiglitz 1981). In a recent study, Osborne
(2003) reported that in Ethiopia the price of maize has more than doubled three times
over the last ﬁfteen years.
Not only many developing countries, but also the United States and the European
Union, havethusexperimentedwithsomeformofcommoditypricestabilizationscheme
in the past. In particular, attempts have been made to stabilize agricultural commodity
markets by means of a commodity buffer stock scheme. The idea of such schemes is
to put a certain amount of output into storage in years in which there is a good harvest,
thus increasing the price from what it would have been, and to sell output from the
storage in years in which there is a small harvest, thus reducing the price from what
it would have been. Another prominent example is the oil market. Following the oil
crises in the 1970s, many countries built up huge oil reserves in order to inﬂuence the
market.
Demand and supply schedules, storage and fully rational speculators are the key
elements in neo-classical commodity market models (Waugh 1944, Brennan 1958,
Williams and Wright 1991, Deaton and Laroque 1992, 1996, Chambers and Bai-
ley 1996, Osborne 2003). While these models undoubtedly capture some important
aspects of commodity markets, their ability to mimic features such as bubbles and
crashes is, however, limited. Supporters of these models - in which the markets are
efﬁcient by nature - judge commodity price stabilization schemes as unlikely to have
a signiﬁcant beneﬁcial effect (Newbery and Stiglitz 1981).
Contrary to the efﬁcient market hypothesis, however, there is not only widespread
populist feeling that speculators are a major cause of price instability, but also theoret-
ical papers have started to explore this aspect. The chartist-fundamentalist approach,
developed in the last decade, offers a new and promising alternative behavioral per-
spective of ﬁnancial market dynamics. The main feature of this approach is that in-
teractions between heterogeneous agents, so-called chartists and fundamentalists, may
generate an endogenous nonlinear law of motion of asset prices. In Day and Huang
(1990), Chiarella (1992), and Farmer and Joshi (2002) the nonlinearity originates from
nonlinear technical and fundamental trading rules whereas in Kirman (1991), Brock
and Hommes (1998), Lux and Marchesi (2000), the nonlinearity is caused by the
agents switching between a given set of predictors. More recent reﬁnements and ap-
plications include Chiarella and He (2001), Chiarella, Dieci and Gardini (2002) and
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stylized facts of ﬁnancial markets quite well one may conclude that this framework is
suitable to conduct some policy evaluation experiments.
This paper aims at developing a commodity market model along the lines of the
chartist-fundamentalist approach to characterize price ﬂuctuations and to unravel the
potential effects of price limiters. Its main ingredients are as follows: For simplicity,
demand and supply schedules are expressed in a reduced log-linear form. Fundamental
to the model is the behavior of the speculators who switch between technical and
fundamental trading rules to determine their positions in the market. Prices adjust via
a log-linear price impact function: Excess supply (demand) decreases (increases) the
price. Our model shows that: (i) the chartists are a source of market instability, as
commonly believed, (ii) weak reaction of the speculators (either the fundamentalists
or the chartists) can push the market to be either a bull or a bear market (through
pitchfork bifurcations); and (iii) strong reaction of the speculators causes market prices
to switch irregularly between bull and bear markets (through ﬂip bifurcations). Since
prices ﬂuctuate in a complex way between bull and bear markets, the model is capable
of replicating some features of commodity price motion.
The paper then focuses on the impact of simple price limiters as a potential stabi-
lizing mechanism to reduce price ﬂuctuations. Simulations reveal that if a central au-
thority guarantees a minimum price, e.g. to support the producers, volatility declines.
Although the price is backed up from below, the average price of the commodity sur-
prisingly decreases, too. Setting up an upper price limit, e.g. to protect consumers
from excessive prices, again yields a drop in price variability. However, the average
price the consumers have to pay increases. At least at ﬁrst sight, this result appears
to be counterintuitive and should give policy-makers a warning. Simple measures to
control prices may have surprising consequences in a nonlinear world.
This puzzling outcome is caused by a dynamic lock-in effect. Consider the case of
a crash without a price limiter mechanism. Within our model, a bull market turns into
a bear market after the price has crossed a critical upper level. A central authority that
intervenes successfully against high prices obviously destroys the necessary condition
for such a regime shift. As a result, the average price is higher than without an upper
price restriction. Moreover, since the price ﬂuctuates at a high level, it reaches the
upper price boundary repeatedly so that the buffer stock is likely to run empty rather
quickly. We show that one way to counter this problem is to alternate temporarily be-
tween an upper and a lower price boundary. The price volatility then decreases, yet
the market remains distorted. However, on-off switching of the stabilization mecha-
nism as well as changing the level of price limiters interferes with the price discovery
process and may cause severe bubbles and crashes or volatility clustering.
As it turns out, price limiters as applied in our model are identical to a recently
developed chaos control method. The development of chaos control algorithms was
initiated by Ott, Grebogi and Yorke (1990) (henceforth OGY). Other popular sugges-
tions include, for instance, the delayed feedback control method of Pyragas (1992) or
the constant feedback method of Parthasarathy and Sinha (1995). The OGY control
scheme and its descendants have been applied in various ﬁelds such as mechanics,4 HE, WESTERHOFF
electronics or chemistry. Economic applications include Kopel (1997), Kaas (1998) or
Westerhoff and Wieland (2004). The feasibility of using chaos controllers in reality
depends on the complexity and efﬁciency of the control algorithm. The chaos con-
trol process requires measurement of the system’s state, generation of a control signal,
and the application of the control signal to an accessible system parameter. For in-
stance, the original OGY control scheme requires knowledge of the map and its ﬁxed
point. While such information may be identiﬁed from observations in natural science
applications, chaos control in an economic context is often seen as rather critical.
However, Corron, Pethel and Hopper (2000) present experimental evidence that
chaos control can be accomplished using simple limiters and argue that chaos control
can be practically applied to a much wider array of important problems than thought
possible until recently. This method, which has been analytically and numerically ex-
plored by Wagner and Stoop (2000) and Stoop and Wagner (2003), simply restricts
the phase space that can be explored. Suppose that a variable ﬂuctuates between
0 < x < l. A limiter from below resets all values x < h to h. As a result, the new sys-
tem may replace previously chaotic behavior with periodic behavior. One advantage
of the limiter method is that it does not add complexity to the system by increasing the
size of the system’s state space. Another advantage is that stabilization may already
be achieved by infrequent interventions. As far as we are aware, this paper contains
the ﬁrst economic study of limiters. And indeed, the method is able to decrease price
ﬂuctuations quite easily, yet with the (economic) disadvantage of a lock-in effect as
stressed above.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple
commodity market model with heterogeneous interacting agents and, by using stability
and bifurcation analysis, section 3 examines the price dynamics of the model without
price limiter mechanisms. In section 4, we discuss the consequences of single-price
limiters for the price dynamics, and in section 5, we introduce conditional price lim-
iters. The ﬁnal section concludes the paper.
2. THE MODEL
As reported in the introduction, commodity markets are extremely volatile and reg-
ularly display severe bubbles and crashes. Such price dynamics may, of course, be
triggered by demand and supply shocks. Moreover, cobweb models show that com-
plicated price motion may also occur due to nonlinearities (Hommes 1994, Brock and
Hommes 1997, Goeree and Hommes 2000 and Chiarella and He 2003). However,
there may exist an additional source for market instability. Note that many commodi-
ties are traded at stock exchanges (e.g. at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange). As is
well known, speculators take large positions in commodity markets. For empirical ac-
counts on the behavior of speculators in these markets see, e.g., Smidt (1965), Draper
(1985), Canoles et al. (1998), Sanders et al. (2000) or Weiner (2002). Surprisingly,
this aspect has received only scant attention so far. In this paper, we thus develop aCOMMODITY MARKETS, PRICE LIMITERS AND SPECULATIVE PRICE DYNAMICS 5
stylized commodity market model with heterogeneous speculators to study the impli-
cations of some popular price stabilization schemes. To understand the workings of
these mechanisms, we strive to design a model that is as simple as possible. Since our
focus is on the activity of speculators, we describe the demand and supply decisions
of consumers and producers, which have been studied in detail in many neo-classical
models, in a reduced form.
Moreover, we can apply well-established building blocks used in the literature on
chartist and fundamentalist interactions. That is, we consider a market with three types
of agents: consumers, producers and speculators. Speculators are heterogeneous in the
sense that they are aware of both technical and fundamental trading strategies, and, at
the beginning of each trading period, they choose one of the two strategies as their
trading strategy for the trading period. Their behavior may be regarded as boundedly
rational since the selection of a strategy depends on market circumstances.
Following Farmer and Joshi (2002), we assume that the price adjustment on the
commodity market may be approximated by a log-linear price impact function. Hence,
the log of price S at time t + 1 is















t stand for the excess demand of the real economy, the chartists and the
fundamentalists respectively at time t. The weight of the chartists at time t is given as
W C
t , whereas the weight of the fundamentalists is given as W F
t . According to (2.1),
the (log of the) commodity price increases when there is an excess demand, and vice
versa.
We use a reduced form to describe the demand and supply decisions of the real
economy. Suppose that the demand and supply schedules of consumers and producers
are log-linear. Then the excess demand may be expressed as
D
M
t = m(F ¡ St); (2.2)
where m reﬂects the slopes of the demand and supply curves. The excess demand of
the real economy is zero when the log of the price is equal to the log of the long-run
equilibrium price F, also called the fundamental value. We assume that the structure
of the economy is stable, i.e. there are no (permanent) demand and supply shocks. As
a result, F is constant over time and common knowledge. Note that in the absence of
speculators (W C
t = W F
t = 0), the law of motion of the commodity’s log price has
a unique ﬁxed point at St = F, which is stable for 0 < am < 2. Such a state is
obviously efﬁcient.
Speculators are familiar with both technical and fundamental analysis. Indeed, the
use of destabilizing trend extrapolation and stabilizing mean reversion trading strate-
gies has been conﬁrmed in many empirical studies (Smidt 1965, Draper 1985, Canoles
et al. 1998, Sanders et al. 2000, Weiner 2002) as well as in laboratory experiments
(Smith 1991, Sonnemans et al. 2003). To model the excess demand generated by6 HE, WESTERHOFF
technical analysis we adopt a formulation of Day and Huang (1990)
D
C
t = b(St ¡ F); (2.3)
where b is a positive reaction coefﬁcient. So-called chartists typically believe in bear
and bull markets. As long as the price is above its fundamental value, chartists regard
the market as bullish. Since a further price increase is expected, chartists tend to buy
the commodity. However, if the price drops below its fundamental value then the
chartists become pessimistic. In a bear market, chartists sell the commodity. Since
changes in excess demand are positively correlated with changes in price, (2.3) is—in
a broader sense—consistent with positive feedback trading.
Fundamental analysis presumes that prices revert toward their fundamental value.
If the price is below (above) its equilibrium value, higher (lower) prices are expected
and fundamental analysis favors buying (selling) the commodity. The excess demand
generated by fundamental analysis may be formalized as
D
F
t = c(F ¡ St): (2.4)
The reaction coefﬁcient c is positive.
The switching mechanism is based on an argument put forward by Hommes (2001).
Speculators try to exploit bull and bear market situations. However, the more the price
deviates from its fundamental value, the greater the speculators perceive the risk that
the bull or bear market might collapse. As a result, an increasing number of speculators
opt for fundamental trading strategies. The market share of speculators who follow





1 + d(F ¡ St)2: (2.5)
The higher the switching parameter d > 0, the faster speculators switch to fundamental
analysis as the mispricing increases. The weight of fundamentalists is W F
t = 1¡W C
t .
The recurrence relation that determines the dynamics of the model is obtained by
combining (2.1)-(2.5)
St+1 = St + a
·
m(F ¡ St) ¡ b
F ¡ St
1 + d(F ¡ St)2 + c
(F ¡ St)3
1 + d(F ¡ St)2
¸
; (2.6)
which is a one-dimensional nonlinear map.
1
1Our model is inspired by the seminal work of Day and Huang (1990) who derive a nonlinear stock
market model by showing that the fundamentalists demand function may be S-shaped. Their model
is able to produce irregular ﬂuctuations between bull and bear markets. Indeed, the dynamics of both
models is caused by a cubic one-dimensional map. The cubic nature of our model basically results from
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3. PRICE DYNAMICS WITHOUT PRICE BOUNDARIES
The model (2.6) can be written as:
St+1 = f(St); (3.1)
where
f(x) = x + a(x ¡ F)
·
¡ m +
b ¡ cd(F ¡ x)2
1 + d(F ¡ x)2
¸
; (3.2)
and a;b;c;d;m are positive constants. Since parameter a can be treated as a scaling
factor, we assume a = 1. Correspondingly, we have
f(x) = x + (x ¡ F)
·
¡ (m + c) +
b + c
1 + d(F ¡ x)2
¸
; (3.3)
We now consider in details some properties of the map, including symmetry, invertibil-
ity, existence of ﬁxed points, their stability, bifurcation, homoclinic orbit, and routes to
complicated price dynamics. The cubic nature of the one-dimensional map has been
well studied and explained analytically in the literature, see e.g. Devaney (1989), Day
and Huang (1990), and more recently Dieci, Bischi and Gardini (2001). The analysis
will lead to insight of the price dynamics when price limiters are imposed.
Symmetry property: It is easy to verify that f(2F ¡ x) = 2F ¡ f(x). Hence the
map f is symmetric with respect to F. This implies that any cycle, if it exists, is either
symmetric with respect to F or admits a symmetric cycle.
Fixed points, local stability and bifurcation: Let ¯ x be the steady state of the map
xt+1 = f(xt). Then it satisﬁes
(¯ x ¡ F)
(b ¡ m) ¡ (c + m)d(F ¡ ¯ x)2
1 + d(F ¡ ¯ x)2 = 0: (3.4)
Obviously, the log of the fundamental price ¯ x = F is always a steady state. In addition,
when b > m, there exist two no-fundamental steady state prices





which are, of course, symmetric to F. It follows from (3.3) that
f
0(x) = 1 ¡ m ¡ c +
b + c




1 + d(x ¡ F)2
¸
: (3.6)
Then the eigenvalue at F is given by ¸ = f0(F) = 1 ¡ m + b. Therefore, ¸ = 1
when m = b and ¸ = ¡1 when b = m ¡ 2. Accordingly, F is locally asymptotically
stable when either m · 2 and 0 · b < m or m > 2 and m ¡ 2 < b < m. For
b > m, there exits two non-fundamental state state S§ with eigenvalue ¸ = f0(S§) =8 HE, WESTERHOFF
1 ¡ 2(m + c)(b ¡ m)=(b + c). Obviously, ¸ = 1 when b = m and ¸ = ¡1 when
b = [c + m(m + c)]=[m + c ¡ 1]. Let
b1 = m ¡ 2; b2 = m ¡ 1; b3 =
c + m(m + c)
m + c ¡ 1
: (3.7)
Note that b1 < b2 < m < b3 for m+c > 1. This analysis leads to the following result.
Proposition 3.1. For model (2.6),
² the log of the fundamental price F is always a steady state,
² thereexisttwoadditional non-fundamentalsteadystateprices S§ whenb > m,
² the steady state F is locally asymptotically stable (LAS) if either m · 2 and
0 · b < m or m > 2 and b1 < b < m, and unstable for b > m,
² a pitchfork bifurcation occurs at b = m,
² both non-fundamental steady states S§ are LAS if either m+c · 1 and b > m
or m + c > 1 and m < b < b3,
² a period doubling bifurcation occurs at b = b3 if m + c > 1.
It is well known that, in the standard cobweb (linear) model, the fundamental price
is stable only if the slope of the demand and supply m < 2. Proposition 3.1 indi-
cates that a limited extrapolation from the chartists is stabilizing an otherwise unstable
fundamental value. In fact, F is LAS when the slope of the demand and supply sat-
isﬁes m < 2 and the chartists extrapolate weakly (b < m). For m > 2, the local
stability of F is regained when a limited extrapolation from the chartists is allowed
(m ¡ 2 < b < m). Note that the fundamental value can lose its stability through
a pitchfork bifurcation when the chartists extrapolate strongly (b > m), leading to
two LAS non-fundamental steady state prices S§. Therefore, the extrapolation of the
chartists has a double-edged effect in terms of the stability of the fundamental value—
a weak (strong) extrapolation of chartists is stabilizing (destabilizing).
2 In addition,
the non-fundamental steady state S§ increasingly deviate from F as the extrapolation
from the chartists increases and they lose stability through a period doubling bifur-
cation, leading to two stable cycles of period two. Further bifurcations and dynamics
depend on the invertibility of the map. Not that, for b > m and m+c > 1, b3 decreases
as c increases. In addition, b3 ! m + 1 as c ! 1 and b3 ! m2=(m ¡ 1) as c ! 0.
Invertibility of the map. The map is invertible if both forward and backward itera-
tions are uniquely deﬁned. As regards the conditions for the map to be invertible, we
have the following result (proven in the Appendix).
2This double edged effect is also found in Chiarella and He (2003) where heterogeneous learning is
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Proposition 3.2. When m · 1, the map is invertible for m + c · 1 and not invertible
for m + c > 1. When m > 1, the map is invertible for b · b2 = m ¡ 1 and not
invertible for b > b2.
Proposition 3.2 implies that for m < 1, the map becomes not invertible when the
fundamentalists react strongly (m+c > 1). For m > 1, the map becomes not invertible
when the chartists extrapolates strongly (b > b2). Hence two types of speculators play
different role.
Trapping intervals, invariant sets, and homoclinic bifurcation. Based on above anal-
ysis it is clear that once the reaction parameters b or c cross a certain threshold, the map
becomes not invertible. To illustrate the local and global behaviours of the map, we
now follow a particular bifurcation route to homoclinic bifurcation and complicated
price dynamics by choosing c = 1:5;d = 1;m = 1;F = 0 and the extrapolation rate
of the chartists b as the changing parameter. Since m = 1 and m + c = 2:5 > 1, it
follows from Propositions 3.2 that the map is not invertible for b > m ¡ 1 = 0. The
ﬁrst two panels of Figure 3.1 show that the log of the fundamental price F = 0 is stable
for 0 < b < 1 and unstable for b > 1. A pitchfork bifurcation occurs at b = 1, leading
to two symmetric (locally) stable non-fundamental prices S§ for 1 < b < b3 = 2:667.
Because the map is noninvertible, the global basins of each non-fundamental price
S§ is made up of inﬁnitely many more disjoint intervals. At b = b3, two symmetric
stable cycles of period two appear. As b increases further, each stable 2-cycle of the
map undergoes a ﬂip bifurcation, leading to a new attractive period-4-cycle, and so
on. Therefore the map undergoes a typical route of period-doubling to complex price
dynamics, which characterizes the price dynamics in either the bull or bear market. At
b ¼ 4:36, a homoclinic bifurcation occurs.
3
For the same set of parameter, panels (a)-(c) in Figure 3.2 illustrate the impact of the
homolinic bifurcation of the map (without price limiter). Because of the invertibility
of the map, there exist two prices Sm;SM satisfying Sm < F < SM such that the
map has local minimum at Sm and local maximum at SM. Denote Fm = f(Sm)
and FM = f(SM). As illustrated for instance in Devaney (1989) (see also Day and
Huang (1990) and Dieci, Bischi and Gardini (2001) for economic applications), the
homoclinic bifurcation occurs precisely when the local maximum FM and the local
minimum Fm are exactly mapped into the repelling steady state F, that is, f(Fm) =
f(FM) = F. This is the case for b ¼ 4:36. Panel (a) of Figure 3.1 reveals that for
b = 4, the intervals Im = [Fm;f(Fm)] and IM = [FM;f(FM)] are invariant trapping
intervals satisfying Im\IM = ; and prices are locked in either the bull or bear market.
At the homoclinic bifurcation value b = 4:36 (panel (b)), the two invariant trapping
intervals join together. After the homoclinic bifurcation (b = 4:5), the intervals Im
and IM are no longer invariant intervals. In fact, Im \ IM 6= ;. Instead their union
3The bottom two panels of Figure 3.1 display bifurcation diagrams with respect to parameter c, i.e. the
reaction coefﬁcient of the fundamentalists. Note that similar routes to complicated dynamics occur.10 HE, WESTERHOFF
I = Im [ IM becomes the new trapping invariant interval. Consequently, the two
disjoint one-piece complicated attractors merge into a single piece of strange attractor,
characterising the irregular switching between the bull and bear markets.
4 Overall, the
existence of a homolinic bifurcation leads to a remarkable qualitative change in the
price dynamics, routing to complicated price dynamics.
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 FIGURE 3.1. Bifurcation diagrams for parameters b and c using dif-
ferent initial conditions. The parameters are increased in 500 steps as
indicated on the axis. Log prices are plotted from t = 500 ¡ 600. The
other parameters are a = 1;b = 4:5;c = 1:5;d = 1;m = 1 and F = 0.
4See also the ﬁrst two bifurcation plots of ﬁgure 1 and the top panel of Figure 4.1 (next section). The
latter presents an example of the intricate price dynamics in the time domain.COMMODITY MARKETS, PRICE LIMITERS AND SPECULATIVE PRICE DYNAMICS 11
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FIGURE 3.2. Homoclinic bifurcation of the map without price limiter
(a)-(c) and with price limiter (d). The other parameters are a = 1;c =
1:5;d = 1;m = 1;F = 0.
The local and global bifurcations are summarized in Figure 3.3 which illustrates the
local stability regions of the steady state prices and the various bifurcation curves in
parameter space (b, c) for given d = 1;m = 1;F = 0.
4. SIMPLE PRICE LIMITERS
Next, we study the consequences of the limiter method - as suggested by Corron,
Pethel and Hopper (2000)—on commodity price dynamics. Price limiters may easily
be implemented in our framework. In the case of a minimum log price Smin, (2.1)
becomes
St+1 = Max[f(St);S







  FIGURE 3.3. Stability region Y for the log of the fundamental value
F and Z for the two non-fundamental prices S§ in parameter space
(b;c). In addition, pitchfork, ﬂip and homoclinic bifurcations. The
other parameters are d = 1;m = 1;F = 0.
in the case of a maximum log price Smax, the price adjustment modiﬁes according to
St+1 = Min[f(St);S
max]; (4.2)




In order to avoid black markets, the central authority has, of course, to intervene in the
market. For instance, to prevent the price from dropping below the minimum price the
central authority has to buy a fraction of the supplied commodity.
Let us start the analysis by comparing the two time series displayed in Figure 4.1,
where we assume a = 1;b = 4:5;c = 1:5;d = 1;m = 1 and F = 0. The top panel
of Figure 4.1 shows the evolution of the log of the commodity price without a price
limiter in the time domain (200 observations). Visual inspection reveals the model’s
ability to produce bubbles and crashes, as observed in many commodity markets.
Concerned with the turbulent dynamics, a central authority may try to support the
producers by guaranteeing them a minimum price. The bottom panel of Figure 4.1
presents a simulation run in which Smin = ¡1:6. The impact of such a price stabiliza-
tion scheme may be quite dramatic. Note ﬁrst that the price ﬂuctuations appear to be
much lower. And in fact, the variance of the price drops from around 1.11 (no price
restriction) to 0.18. But the average price is also affected by this policy. Now, the price
always ﬂuctuates below its fundamental value. To be precise, the average log price
decreases from about 0 to -1.07 (all statistics are based on simulation runs with 10,000
observations). At least at ﬁrst sight, this is surprising. The central authority aims to
protect the producers from too low prices, yet the average price drops.COMMODITY MARKETS, PRICE LIMITERS AND SPECULATIVE PRICE DYNAMICS 13



























 FIGURE 4.1. The top panel shows the unrestricted evolution of the
commoditys log price in the time domain. The bottom panel shows
the same, but with a lower price boundary of Smin = ¡1:6. The other
parameters are a = 1;b = 4:5;c = 1:5;d = 1;m = 1 and F = 0.
On ﬁrst sight, this outcome may appear puzzling. However, the analysis of the
previous section helps us to understand this phenomenon. Note that any interruption
of the existence of the homoclinic bifurcation, such as price limiters, will rule out
possible random switching between bull and bear markets and lead prices to be trapped
in either the bull or the bear market. Panel (d) of Figure 3.2, which is based on the
same parameter setting as panel (c), shows the impact of a price limiter on the price
dynamics. Now it is clear that a change from a bear market into a bull market requires
the price to drop to a rather low value. But, due to the price cap, the map in panel (d)
is ﬂat at Smin = ¡1:6. This prevents the system from switching from a bear market to
a bull market. Clearly, the price is trapped below its fundamental value.
Figure 4.2 further investigates this dynamic lock-in effect. The top left panel shows
a bifurcation diagram in which the minimum log price is increased in 500 steps from -2
to 0. To allow the system to settle on its attractor, the dynamics is plotted for log prices
between the periods 500 and 600. As can be seen, the complicated behavior turns into
periodic behavior as the minimum log price increases. At around pmin = ¡1:18, even
a ﬁxed point emerges. The top right panel reveals symmetrical results for an upper
price boundary, which decreases from 2 to 0.
The second and third panels in Figure 4.2 present how the mean and the variance
of the price react to a change in the price limit. To obtain reasonable statistics, IID
shocks with white noise N(0;0:1) are added to the system at every time step. The
limiter method indeed proves its power in stabilizing the dynamics. Already minor
price restrictions may eliminate the larger part of the price variability. But the average14 HE, WESTERHOFF
price is simultaneously affected. Restricting the price from below (above) increases
(decreases) the mean of the price in an adverse manner. Only if the restrictions are









































































  FIGURE 4.2. The bifurcation diagrams in the ﬁrst line of panels show
how log prices react to more restrictive price boundaries. Log price lim-
its are varied in 500 steps and log prices are plotted from t = 500¡600.
The parameter setting is as in Figure 4.1. The second and third lines of
panels show the mean and the variance of the price process (buffeted
with dynamic noise N(0;0:1). All statistics are based on 10,000 obser-
vations.
To sum up, it turns out that the price dynamics under price limiters when both spec-
ulators react strongly is similar to the price behavior without imposing price limitersCOMMODITY MARKETS, PRICE LIMITERS AND SPECULATIVE PRICE DYNAMICS 15
when either of the speculators react weakly. Consequently, one may conclude that the
central authority eliminates the strong reactions of the speculators that push for the
market to crash, leading to a bull market with high average price
5. CONDITIONAL PRICE LIMITERS
Comparing the dynamics with and without price limiters, one can see that by im-
posing certain price limiters a central authority can effectively limit strong reactions
of the speculators and stabilize the market price. However, such a policy may lead
to substantial costs for the central authority. For example, to prevent the price from
dropping below (going above) the minimum (maximum) price, the central authority
permanently has to buy (sell) a fraction of the supplied (stored) commodity. Apart
from the cost issue (e.g. for maintaining a buffer stock), non-negative storage of the
commodity prevents unlimited selling at high price limiters. To implement such inter-
ventions more successfully, we introduce a conditional price limiter mechanism in this
section.
The top panel of Figure 5.1 shows log price dynamics when the central authority
switches between two price limiters: Smin = ¡1:3 and Smax = 1:3. If the buffer stock
exceeds a level of about §15 a regime shift occurs. As can be seen, the price is thus
stabilized either in the bull market or in the bear market. The duration of a regime
is around 80 periods. Between the two regimes we observe a brief transient phase of
around 20 periods in which the price evolves uncontrolled. Although the price is still
distorted, conditional price limiters decrease the price volatility. The bottom panel of
ﬁgure 8 presents the corresponding development of the buffer stock which now neither
runs empty nor becomes inﬁnitely large. Note that by buying low and selling high the
interventions may be proﬁtable in the long run.
It is quite interesting to see how the market prices are inﬂuenced by such a policy.
Speculators may discover and respond to ﬁxed price limiters. To prevent arbitrage
opportunities, central authorities may thus use more ﬂexible price limiters. Figure 5.2
aims to demonstrate that the imposition of price limiters may create dramatic price
changes such as bubbles and crashes. In the top panel of Figure 5.2, it is assumed that
thecentralauthoritystabilizesthelogofthepriceinthebearmarketwithapricelimiter
of -1.3. However, from time to time interventions are brieﬂy interrupted. For instance,
the policy-makers may become afraid of the costs associated with their policy. But
seeing that without interventions the price increases dramatically, the policy-makers
may change their opinion once more and reactivate their old policy. Then the price is
again bounded in the lower region. As a result, price patterns that resemble bubbles
and crashes may simply emerge due to the activity of policy-makers.
In the second panel of Figure 5.2, the central authority applies a price limiter of
Smin = ¡1:3, buffeted with dynamic noise N(0;0:3). Overall, the dynamics is still
stabilized. However, now and then prices run away from bear markets. The reason
is that the price limiter may be set too low to achieve the lock-in effect. In the third16 HE, WESTERHOFF


























FIGURE 5.1. The top panel shows log price dynamics when the cen-
tral authority switches between log price limiters Smin = ¡1:3 and
Smax = 1:3. A change in regime occurs if the buffer stock exceeds a
level of about §15. The bottom panel shows the corresponding evolu-
tion of the buffer stock. The other parameters are a = 1;b = 4:5;c =
1:5;d = 1;m = 1 and F = 0.
panel of ﬁgure 7, the central authority regulates the market with Smin = ¡1:3 and
Smax = 1:3, both buffeted with dynamic noise N(0;0:3). Again, temporary stabiliza-
tions either in the bull or in the bear market set in.
5
Finally, in the fourth panel of Figure 5.2, the price limiters are modeled as ﬁrst-
order auto-regressive processes around §1:3 with AR coefﬁcients of 0.975 and noise
N(0;0:1). Note that the price dynamics become increasingly realistic when the lim-
iters are varied in a stochastic matter. Although the behaviors of consumers, producers
and speculators are still deterministic, the price behavior is quite intricate. Visual in-
spection reveals bubbles and crashes, alternating periods of low and high volatility and
also larger jumps, which may yield fat tail behavior of the distribution of the returns.
6
What causes the increase in the complexity of the dynamics? The answer is quite sim-
ple. Figure 4.2 already reveals that different price limiters result in different dynamic
outcomes, e.g. a ﬁxed point may be transformed into a limit cycle. In addition, pertur-
bations of the price limiters work as shocks to the system and thus transient behavior
may occur.
5For a discussion of price caps and stochastic price processes see Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
6Indeed, applying the Hill tail index estimator procedure we ﬁnd that the model is able to produce tail
indices of around 3.5. Estimation of the Hurst coefﬁcient for absolute returns reveals values of around
0.75, indicating strong volatility clustering.COMMODITY MARKETS, PRICE LIMITERS AND SPECULATIVE PRICE DYNAMICS 17






















































FIGURE 5.2. Log price dynamics under different regimes. First panel:
Smin = ¡1:25; interrupted every 100 periods. Second panel: Smin =
¡1:3, buffeted with dynamic noise N(0;0:3). Third panel: Smin =
¡1:3 and Smax = 1:3, both buffeted with dynamic noise N(0;0:3).
Fourth panel: Log price limiters as ﬁrst-order auto-regressive processes
around §1:3 with AR coefﬁcients of 0.975 and noise N(0;0:1). The
other parameters are a = 1;b = 4:5;c = 1:5;d = 1;m = 1 and F = 0.
6. CONCLUSIONS
This paper is concerned with commodity price dynamics. Actual commodity prices
ﬂuctuate strongly: Not only is the price volatility high, also severe bubbles and crashes
regularly emerge. Hence, this topic is of great practical importance, particularly for the
formulation of economic policy. Although producers and consumers are two primary
participants in commodity markets, there are also other participants, such as specula-
tors, who may have a marked effect both on the degree of price variability and on the
success of any commodity price stabilization scheme.18 HE, WESTERHOFF
Within our model, interactions between heterogeneous agents create complex bull
and bear market ﬂuctuations, which resemble the cyclical price dynamics of many
commodity markets. Our model shows that: (i) the chartists are a source of market
instability, as commonly believed; (ii) weak reaction of the speculators (either the fun-
damentalists or the chartists) can push the market to be either a bull or a bear market
(throughpitchforkbifurcations); and(iii)strongreactionofthespeculatorscausesmar-
ket prices to ﬂuctuate irregularly between bull and bear markets (through homoclinic
bifurcations). Furthermore, we investigate how price boundaries, which function iden-
tically to a recently suggested chaos control method, affect the price dynamics. We
ﬁnd that simple price limits (i) reduce the variability of prices quite strongly, (ii) are
likely to shift the price in an adverse direction, (iii) and may lead to an unsustainable
buffer stock. The results are caused by a dynamic lock-in effect. By restricting the
evolution of the price, the dynamics may become stuck in either the bull or the bear
market. However, jumping between bottoming and topping price limiters allows a
central authority to manage the evolution of the buffer stock. Prices are then temporar-
ily stabilized in the bull market or the bear market. But it should not be overlooked
that whenever a central authority introduces a price stabilization scheme it changes the
price discovery process. For instance, price limiters may trigger marked bubbles and
crashes or volatility clustering.
The study of heterogeneous interacting agents has yielded a number of quite so-
phisticated models which have proven to be quite successful in explaining ﬁnancial
market dynamics. Our simple commodity market model is inspired by this approach
and we would ﬁnally like to point out some interesting extensions. First of all, one may
consider some other popular technical trading rules. For example, agents are often re-
ported to extrapolate the most recent price trend. Moreover, as argued in Chiarella
(1992) or Farmer and Joshi (2002), technical analysis may be nonlinear. Secondly,
agents may involve some adaptive learning processes when choosing a particular trad-
ing strategy. For example, the behavior of chartists and fundamentalists may not be
constant over time with respect to their reaction coefﬁcients, and, although agents are
boundedly rational, they may try to learn those coefﬁcients. Alternatively, agents’
expectations may follow some adaptive learning processes. Thirdly, agents may incor-
porate other switching mechanisms. As argued in Brock and Hommes (1998), one may
assign each forecast rule a ﬁtness function (which may depend on the historical perfor-
mance of the rules) and then let the agent select a rule according to its ﬁtness. Higher
complexity may also be achieved by switching from a two-speculator type analysis to
a real multi-agent market model (Lux and Marchesi 2000). Of course, the behavior of
both the producers and consumers may also be modeled in more detail. For instance,
the producers may base their production decision on expected future prices and thus
select between different kinds of forecast rules, as modeled in Brock and Hommes
(1997). Finally, the working of different price limiter schemes may also be tested in
a laboratory setting. Promising work on experimental asset pricing markets has been
done by Smith (1991) or Sonnemans et al. (2004).COMMODITY MARKETS, PRICE LIMITERS AND SPECULATIVE PRICE DYNAMICS 19
Appendix A. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.2
The map f(x) is not invertible if there exists ˜ x such that f0(˜ x) = 0. Let z =
1 + d[x ¡ F]2. It follows from (3.3) and f0(˜ x) = 0 that ˜ z = 1 + d[˜ x ¡ F]2 satisﬁes
(m + c ¡ 1)˜ z
2 + (b + c)˜ z ¡ 2(b + c) = 0: (A.1)




2(m + c ¡ 1
·
¡ (b + c) §
p
(b + c)2 + 8(b + c)(m + c ¡ 1)
¸
: (A.2)
Note that ˜ x exists only if ˜ z > 1. Hence ˜ z+ is the only possible choice. Also it can be
veriﬁed that ˜ z > 1 is equivalent to b > b2 = m ¡ 1 ¸ 0. Therefore, when m ¸ 1, the
map is invertible for b · b2 and not invertible for b > b2.
We now assume that m < 1. If m + c = 1, then ˜ z = 2. If m + c > 1, then ˜ z+ > 1.
Therefore the map is not invertible for m + c ¸ 1. If m + c < 1, then ˜ z are positive
only if b > ¡8(m ¡ 1) ¡ 7c. Also, ˜ z > 1 leads to b < m ¡ 1, which is impossible.
Therefore the map is invertible. This completes the proof.
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